Research

Published Articles

1. Expert Disagreement and the Duty to Vote (2025). Philosophers’ Imprint

   (pen access published version | a brief summary for New Work in Philosophy)

2. Should you Defer to Individual Experts? (2025). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

   (pre-print | final version)

3. Authority or Autonomy? Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Deference to Experts (2025). Philosophical Psychology

   (open access published version)

Co-authored (second author) with Alex Worsnip, Samuel Pratt, Giulia Napolitano, Kurt Gray, and Jeff Greene.

Works-in-Progress (drafts available upon request)

1. A paper on scientific literatures, higher-order evidence, and unpossessed evidence. (title redacted for review)

2. Informed Non-Consent: An Epistemic Condition on Mandatory Vaccination

   • In this paper, I argue for an epistemic condition on permissible mandatory vaccination: those subject to such policies must be in a position to know that the vaccine in question is safe and effective. I then identify some obstacles to being in a position to know that a vaccine is safe and effective: (1) the relevant scientific evidence is inaccessible to most of us, and (2) we are sometimes not in a position to rationally defer to experts. I conclude by suggesting that, in order to promote the satisfaction of the position-to-know condition, the medical and scientific communities should focus their efforts on effectively communicating scientific consensus.