Research
Published Articles
Expert Disagreement and the Duty to Vote (forthcoming). Philosophers’ Imprint
(pre-print | doi: 10.3998/phimp.6172 | a brief summary for New Work in Philosophy)
Should you Defer to Individual Experts? (2025). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Authority or Autonomy? Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Deference to Experts (2025). Philosophical Psychology
Co-authored (second author) with Alex Worsnip, Samuel Pratt, Giulia Napolitano, Kurt Gray, and Jeff Greene.
Other Papers (available upon request)
There’s More to It Than That: How Scientific Literatures Undermine Justification
In this paper, I argue that knowing of the existence of a large scientific literature related to some belief of yours undermines your justification for that belief. This is so because the best explanation of that literature’s existence suggests that the relevant experts took the existing evidence to be insufficient and so produced more. And this suggests that your evidence is insufficient, thus undermining the justification of your belief.
When Should You Believe Scientific Consensus?
In this paper, I evaluate how well different sorts of evidence justify you in believing scientific consensus. Appeals to scientific consensus often invoke (1) consensus statements, (2) surveys of the literature, or (3) surveys of the scientists themselves. I argue that (1) and (2) face serious challenges when it comes to justifying us in believing the content of a consensus, challenges related to groupthink, bias, and judgment dependence. (3), I argue, fares much better as a source of justification for consensus-based beliefs.